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Full Information, Well Being, and Reasonable Desires1
Yonatan Shemmer – The University of Sheffield 
 
 
Introduction 
Griffin in his book ‘Well Being’ claims that we should see desires as normatively 
subordinate to what is good. It is only reasonable, Griffin says, to desire what is 
desirable, valuable or good2
Unfortunately, as I will try to show, what we could reasonably want ourselves to 
desire if we were fully informed does not match what we intuitively think is part of our 
well being. Either our intuitions or the desire based theory of well being must be 
abandoned.  
. Since on such view what it is reasonable to do or to desire is 
determined by what is good, we must have an independent notion of what is good. But 
the history of philosophy is paved with failed attempts to find such independent notion of 
goodness. It is the despair generated by these failures that led major philosophers from 
Hobbes onward to invert the order of priority and base what is good on what we desire. 
According to the simple desire based view to say that something is good for someone is 
to say that the person desires it. One central problem with the simple desire based view is 
that we are sometimes uninformed and then our desires are based on a mistaken picture 
of the world and of ourselves in it. Railton tries to improve on the simple desire based 
view. He suggests that we should base our understanding of value only on well informed 
and rationally generated desires. Why? Because these are the desires that we should want 
ourselves to have. What is valuable, on this view, is what we could reasonably want 
ourselves to desire if we were fully informed.  
 In the first part of this paper I briefly trace the dialectic leading to the formulation 
of Railton’s view and present some famous criticisms made against his view. In the 
second part I consider four possible interpretations of his view and argue that only one of 
these can provide us with a coherent and determinate understanding of well being. In the 
                                                 
1 Thanks to Jules Holroyd, Jimmy Lenman, Elijah Millgram, Shaul Smilanski, and John Skorupski for their 
helpful criticisms and suggestions. 
2 James Griffin, Well Being, OUP 1986 (p. 27) 
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third part I argue that this fourth interpretation clashes with ordinary intuitions about well 
being. 
 
1. The Simple Desire Based View, Railton and Critics 
Consider the following formulation of the simple desire based view as an analysis 
of the notion of well being. According to this analysis:  
A: ‘x is good for me (x is part of my well being) iff I desire x’. 
It is easy to see that this analysis fails. I may desire to take a very strong drug not 
knowing the negative long terms effects of the drug. In this case what I desire is certainly 
not what is good for me.  
Full information theories try to provide a more sophisticated analysis of well 
being in terms of desires in order to deal with this type of counterexample. The basic 
thought behind all full information theories is that we have to understand well being not 
in terms of what the agent desires, but in terms of what she would desire if she had the 
relevant information. Thus we get: 
B: ‘x is good for me iff I would desire x were I to be presented with full 
information about x and the implications of bringing about x’. 
It is often claimed that as stated in ‘B’ full information views are incomplete. 
Information about the objects of one’s desires is insufficient. One has to be informed 
about all possible alternatives in order for one’s desires to be well grounded3. 
Furthermore being exposed to relevant information is not enough. I may be the kind of 
person who is not capable of understanding or of processing the information properly and 
thus I may not absorb the ‘lesson’ of the information to which I was exposed. Therefore 
full information theories ought to require that well being be determined by my desires 
only if I am properly informed and only if I am given the capacity to understand the 
information to which I am exposed4
                                                 
3 I am not sure this criticism is cogent, but this is a topic for another paper. 
. However talking of ‘the capacity to understand 
information’ may not be sufficient either. In order to form a significant desire about 
which one of two movies to see, merely having information about the movies and being 
able to understand this information is not going to suffice either. I also need to know 
4 For such a requirement see W. D. Falk, "On Learning About Reasons," in Ought, Reasons, and Morality 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986). 
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what effect the two movies would have on me. Only someone who experiences the 
movies could know what effect the movies have on him. Finally I must be rational so that 
the desires that I form will be rationally grounded in my other desires and the information 
that is available to me.  
Full information theories can accommodate these additional requirements. For 
example a full information theory can claim that: 
C: ‘x is good for me iff I would desire x under the following conditions: 
a. I am presented with full information about all the possible lives that 
are available to me, b. I have the capacity to understand the 
information I am presented with, c. I have experienced all the possible 
lives that are available to me, d. I am instrumentally rational’. 
 
Call the person I would be if I were fully informed, had increased intellectual 
capacities necessary to understand that new information, had experienced that additional 
information and were rational my fully informed self or FIS; call my actual self AS. 
Many have argued that this extension of full information theories also runs into 
problems. For example, it has been argued that under this analysis what is good for me 
depends on the desires of a person (my FIS) that is in significant ways different from me. 
That person has intellectual capacities I do not have and experiences I do not have. What 
my FIS desires with regard to x, seems to have very little bearing on whether x is good 
for me given the vast differences between us. If, for example, I am an uneducated laborer 
and my FIS has learned math and experienced the joy of proving complicated theorems, 
then his desire to tackle a complicated mathematical question has little relevance to what 
constitutes a good life for me. 
Peter Railton has suggested a formulation of the analysis that full information 
theories give to the concept of well being that would avoid this problem: 
 
An individual’s good consists in what he would want himself to 
want, or to pursue, were he to contemplate his present situation 
from a standpoint fully and vividly informed about himself and 
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his circumstances, and entirely free of cognitive error or lapses 
of instrumental rationality5
 
. 
 
The suggestion slightly reformulated is this: 
D:  ‘X is good for me iff my FIS while contemplating my situation would want me 
to want x’. 
 
This version of the view is sometimes referred to as the ‘advice model’ or AM. 
Many objections have been raised against AM as well. I will not recount all of them. But 
I will briefly mention here two objections raised by Sobel and Rosati6
Both Sobel and Rosati object that the notion of being fully informed is incoherent. 
One thing that I ought to be informed about in order to be fully informed is about how 
events would be experienced by people with different sorts of lives. In fact in order to be 
fully informed I would have to experience any event as it would be experienced by 
people with all possible sorts of lives
, mainly in order to 
keep clear the distinction between their objections and mine. 
7. However to decide what is the best way to 
experience an event I would have to compare the different experiences and thus inhabit 
all potentially conflicting points of view simultaneously. But experiencing an event from 
a point of view excludes experiencing it from a conflicting point of view8. Therefore, 
being fully informed requires one to be in an impossible position. I think this argument is 
successful against the view as currently stated. But in order to present my own argument I 
will temporarily put aside Sobel and Rosati’s argument. I will do so in the hope of 
highlighting a different – and to my mind interesting - problem for fully informed desires 
views of well being9
                                                 
5 Peter Railton, “Facts and Values”, Philosophical Topics XIV, No.2 (Fall 1986): 16. See also Peter 
Railton, “Moral Realism”, Philosophical Review 95 (1986): 173-4.  
. 
6 Connie Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good," Ethics 105, no. 2 
(1995): 296-325, David Sobel, "Full Information Accounts of Well-Being," Ethics 104, no. 4 (1994): 784-
810. 
7 At least with all the forms of life and personalities available to me. 
8 Rosati and Sobel’s objections are much more nuanced and detailed – but I take it that this is the gist of it. 
9 What I will come to see as the only coherent version of Railton’s view can avoid Sobel and Rosati’s 
argument. I will not, however, discuss this in the current paper. 
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Rosati also presents a different objection to fully informed desires views. Her 
objection is based on the assumption that full information theories wish to respect the 
requirements set by motivational internalism. One demand set by motivational 
internalism, says Rosati, is that “The information that you would desire X for yourself 
under the specified conditions [the conditions of full information] will have pull for you, 
even if X itself still fails to move you10”, or maybe in a less stringent form that the “… 
actual person would care about the fact that something would prompt her concern under 
[the ideal] conditions11
But, says Rosati, even if a person were to believe that her fully informed self 
desires x for her, she might not be motivated to get x herself, since she may “contend that 
the fully informed person [is] not really her
”. 
12
 Rosati herself is not sure about the force of her argument. She thinks that we 
should not require that our ideal self will be the same person as our actual self in the 
‘ordinary sense’. “As long as the fully informed standpoint speaks to those concerns that 
led us to seek the bird’s-eye point of view in the first place, we can accord normative 
authority to the reactions of the person who occupies that standpoint
”.  
13.” Such normative 
authority might be all the recommending force that a motivational internalist wishes to 
find in judgments about the good.14
 Whether successful or not, Rosati’s argument depends on a prior internalist 
constraint on views of well being. The argument I will present in the remainder of this 
paper may appear to be similar to Rosati’s argument. But in contrast to Rosati’s 
arguments it does not presuppose internalism
  
15
 
.   
 
                                                 
10 Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good." p. 303. 
11 Ibid., p. 301. 
12 Ibid., p. 311. 
13 Ibid., p. 311. 
14 Rosati proceeds to argue that there are other problems with the normative authority of our fully informed 
self. The process that makes the actual self fully informed introduces so many changes to her personality 
that we cannot be sure that character traits that are normatively repugnant are not introduced into her 
personality. Ibid., p. 312. 
15 For other criticisms of full information views see Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory 
of Normative Judgment, Harvard University Press and David Velleman, "Brandt's Definition Of "Good"," 
The Philosophical Review XCVII, no. 3 (1988): 353-371. 
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2. Four interpretations of Railton’s view 
 The following example will help clarify the discussion. An FIS goes through a 
religious conversion. The conversion is rationally permissible but not required by the 
information available to him. From his point of view after the conversion it is desirable 
that I follow suit. From my perspective it is unreasonable to do so even if I am told that 
he would like me to. In cases in which the choices of my FIS are not rationally required 
by the information available to him, what is unreasonable for me to do constrains what he 
could justifiably want for me. The fourth interpretation I offer below is based on this 
thought. 
 
According to Railton both the desires of the AS for herself and the desires of the 
FIS for herself are not indicative of the AS’ non-moral good (or, well being). What 
constitutes the non-moral good of the AS are the desires of the FIS concerning the desires 
of the AS, when the FIS reflects on the AS’ situation. 
In this section I will assess this analysis of non-moral good. I will consider four 
interpretations of the view. On the first three interpretations the view must be rejected. 
Either it fails to explain how the desires of one’s FIS can, on most but some rare 
occasions, be different from the desires of the actual self; or it ascribes unreasonable 
desires to the FIS, or it gives us an indeterminate account of what non-moral good is. The 
fourth and final interpretation is more successful on all these counts. It explains how the 
desires of one’s fully informed self can significantly diverge from the desires of the 
actual self, it ascribes reasonable desires to the FIS, and it offers a determinate account of 
non-moral good.  But this interpretation as well faces a serious problem. The notion of 
non-moral good that it delineates falls short of our intuitive notion of one’s non-moral 
good.    
 
 The advice model does not describe the criteria that the FIS is supposed to use 
in order to determine what to want for his actual counterpart. Such criteria are clearly 
required. The advice model appears to rely in its determination of non-moral good on the 
natural psychological mechanism of desire formation and desire change in the FIS. But 
Some constraints on any interpretation of the advice model 
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the advice model does not determine the well being of the AS by appeal to the new 
desires of the fully informed self for himself– as we have seen these might not be suitable 
for the actual self – rather the advice model claims that the AS’s well being is determined 
by those desires of the FIS that the FIS deems would be appropriate for the AS. The FIS 
must apply some standards in order to decide what, given his desires for himself, would 
be desirable for his AS. This fact is masked by the language of the advice model. To see 
that consider the relation between two different people. John desires that his neighbor 
clean their common path more often. Here John is merely hoping that his neighbor will 
act in ways that will promote his own (John’s) goals. Since John and his neighbor do not 
have the same goals what John desires for his neighbor is not be what is good for the 
neighbor. The situation might not be different for the FIS and his AS. Since they do not 
have the same goals merely asking the FIS what he desires that the AS desires will only 
reveal something about the FIS’ desiderative system.  If the FIS wants a life of leisure for 
himself and wants a life of hard work for the AS – we should not conclude that hard work 
is good for the AS. Rather we should conclude that the FIS has a perverse desire to see 
his AS suffer. Those who suggest that we should appeal to the desire of the FIS for the 
AS hope that since the FIS and the AS are (in some sense) the same person, the FIS’s 
preferences will reveal what is good for the AS. But we already know that this is not the 
case, since we are asking the FIS not what he desires for himself but rather what he 
desires that the AS desires. Thus the fact that the FIS and the AS are the same person is 
relied on not because the desires of these two counterparts of the self are identical but 
rather because the proponent of the model hope that a person will have some good will 
towards his hypothetical counterpart. What we are really asking the FIS is to take his own 
desires for himself as a base, and perform the appropriate adjustments to fit the 
circumstances of the AS given his good will towards him. But this exercise requires the 
application of some standards in order to determine what is the right adjustment to 
perform, and the advice model does not supply them16
 The fact that we are asking the FIS to apply certain standards or perform an 
adjustment as part of the procedure that determines what is good for the AS is itself not 
. 
                                                 
16 The worry here is similar to a worry discussed by Rosati as part of her argument from internalism. See: 
Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good.", p. 312. 
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unproblematic,17
 One seemingly appealing answer to this problem is that the FIS is supposed to 
want his AS to want everything that he wants for himself minus those things that the AS 
is not going to enjoy. For example, the FIS wants fancy wine for himself, because he has 
experienced many good wines and developed a fine pallet, but he knows that the pleasure 
that the AS (whose pallet is not as sophisticated) is going to get from that wine is not 
worth its price. So he does not want the AS to want the fancy wine. The problem is that 
this way of explaining what the ‘appropriate adjustment’ is, relies on the very concepts 
we are trying to analyze – those of pleasure and well-being. 
 but I want to focus on a more basic problem. The problem is that it is 
just unclear what kind of adjustment the FIS is supposed to make in order to move from 
his own desires to the desire he would like his AS to have.  
What could be the standards that should govern the advice of the FIS? 
We should certainly require that the advice of the FIS would be reasonable. The 
desires the FIS should want the AS to have should be desires she has good reason to want 
the AS to have. Since the FIS is supposed to be fully rational you might think that this 
requirement will already be trivially satisfied. This is doubtful since the FIS is supposed 
to be instrumentally rational and as we have seen instrumental rationality will only ensure 
the satisfaction of the goals of the FIS, goals that may not match those of the AS. In any 
case, we shall make the requirement explicit. 
1. The reasonability constraint: Any interpretation of the advice model should be 
constrained by the requirement that the advice of the FIS would be reasonable. 
 
This constraint does not, however seem sufficient. It is not clear, at least not on 
the face of it, whether merely in virtue of being fully informed and fully reasonable the 
FIS will be benevolent or will care about the actual self’s autonomy. Therefore in order to 
get a satisfying theory of well being we might need to impose further desiderata on the 
nature of the FIS’ desires. We might want to add, for example that the FIS will be 
benevolent. But to add this constraint will make our analysis circular. Being benevolent is 
                                                 
17 The problem is that the initial impetus for a fully informed desires view of well being was the thought 
that by appealing to the desires of my FIS we are replicating the desires that someone like me would have 
with regard to a certain object but under improved epistemic conditions. It now turns out that we are 
appealing to a different process altogether – one that presupposes independent normative standards. 
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intending to promote in one’s actions the well being of the person towards whom one is 
benevolent. If we allow the notion of benevolence into our understanding of the nature of 
the FIS we thereby include the notion of ‘well being’, the very notion we set out to 
analyze in the first place.  
 I will, therefore, focus here on a different desideratum. We must assume that the 
FIS will not want to rob the actual self of her autonomy. The FIS must want for the AS 
only desires that the AS could come to have without loosing her autonomy.  
There are two problems with this suggestion. First what autonomy is, is under 
great dispute. And second, one might think, that autonomy is just one among many goods 
that the FIS should want for the actual self and that the FIS should at least balance the 
goal of ensuring the agent’s autonomy with the a concern for the maximizations of these 
other goods18
To answer the first problem we have to find a minimal constraint that will be 
acceptable to most views of autonomy. I suggest the following constraint: 
. 
The advice of the FIS should be in principle justifiable to the actual self. If the 
FIS cannot explain why it makes sense for the AS to adopt the FIS’ advice then it 
shouldn’t be given. Of course, the actual self may not be in a position to understand the 
justification, but the justification must be such that it could be in principle intelligible to 
others who the AS has good reason to trust. Advice that cannot be justified even in 
principle to someone with sufficient information and who the AS would be rational to 
trust, loses its status as advice and becomes an imposition. And for that to be the case, the 
FIS should at the very least, be able to justify the advice to herself. Advice that she 
cannot justify even to herself is advice that she could not, even in principle, justify to the 
AS. Thus the autonomy constraint and the reasonability constraint seem to partially 
converge. The reasonability constraint is a pre-condition for the satisfaction of the 
autonomy constraint. 
2. The minimal autonomy constraint: Any interpretation of the advice model 
should be constrained by the requirement that the FIS should not give the AS any 
advice which the AS could not even in principle reasonably accept. Where ‘an 
                                                 
18 Thanks to Elijah Millgram for pressing me on that point. 
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advice can be reasonably accepted in principle’ if there could be someone that the 
AS reasonably trusts that could see the justification for accepting the advice. 
 
As for the second problem those who raise it have a point. It is often worth it to 
give up some of your autonomy in order to achieve other goals or other goods. We can 
however accept the central insight behind this objection while maintaining our minimal 
autonomy constraint: we say that it is legitimate for the FIS to advise the AS to act in 
ways that will harm her autonomy as long as the FIS can justify that loss of autonomy. 
Finally any interpretation of the advice model should give us a determinate 
understanding of the agent’s well being. To see the importance of this third constraint it is 
important to remember that on Railton’s view we do not have direct access to one’s non-
moral good. We do not have a characterization of non-moral good in terms of either the 
state of the world that constitutes such good or the mental states that constitute non-moral 
good. The way to the content of one’s non-moral good is oblique. We describe a 
procedure whose outcome, whatever it ends up being, determines one’s non-moral well 
being. But for such oblique characterization to work the procedure must be determinate. 
Unless we have a determinate verdict about the desires of the fully informed agent, we do 
not have a clear analysis of the concept of well being. 
2. Our analysis of the point of view of the fully informed self should give us – in 
principle at least – a determinate answer to the question: what would the fully 
informed person desire that the actual self desires19
 
. 
First interpretation
I will start by considering the view as stated above in D. What is good for the 
actual self according to this formulation is determined by desires of her fully informed 
counterpart. Which desires? Those desires of her fully informed self about the desires of 
the actual self in the circumstances that the actual agent finds herself in.  
  
  An example will help: I hold a glass of transparent liquid in my hand. I am about 
to drink it thinking that it is gin. In fact it is some kind of bitter lemonade20
                                                 
19 There may be some cases in which there is more than one state of affairs that could be part of one’s well 
being. There is no reason to expect the theory to select between these good states of affairs. 
. I dislike 
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bitter lemonade. Fully informed desire views hope to explain why it is good for me not to 
drink the content of my glass by appealing to the desires that my FIS has that I desire not 
to drink the content of my glass. But we should consider the desires of my FIS more 
carefully. 
My FIS, we are told, wants me to want not to drink the content of my glass. But 
how exactly does my FIS want me to come to have the desire not to drink the content of 
my glass? Up to a second ago I either had the desire to drink the content of my glass or I 
was in a psychological state from which I would naturally and rationally develop the 
desire to drink the content of my glass. So which exact changes in my psychology does 
my FIS hope for, changes that will ensure that I have the desires she wishes me to have? 
Since my FIS cannot change the past it must be that she wants me to have a change of 
desires now. But it’s crazy for my FIS to want that I have such an unexplainable 
psychological leap; that I find myself with a desire that has nothing to do with what I 
wanted before, what my plans were and what information was available to me. Wanting 
me to be afflicted by such psychological rift is unreasonable and certainly incompatible 
with the autonomy constraint. So Railton’s view as phrased fails straightaway. 
 We can certainly imagine extreme cases in which the consequence of a failure to 
change my desires is worse than the psychological rift caused by that change. In these 
extreme cases it would be reasonable for my FIS to want me to change my desires. But in 
most cases what my FIS could reasonably desire on my behalf – on the first interpretation 
of Railton’s view - will not diverge from what I desire for myself and will greatly diverge 
from what we intuitively think is good for me.  
 You might think that my requirement that we assess the desires that the FIS has in 
light of the psychological state that I will find myself in if his recommendations about my 
desires be implemented, is one requirement too many. Why? Because, so you may think, 
the recommendations of my FIS about what desire I should have need not really be 
implemented. Talking about which desires my fully informed self would want me to have 
(when he considers my circumstances) is just another way of asking what is good for me. 
So whether I can realistically come to have these desires or not is quite irrelevant. It is 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 This is of course a less dramatic version of Williams’ gin and petrol example in “Internal and External 
Reasons,” reprinted in Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press 1981, p.102. 
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quite possible, you might think, that I cannot come to desire what is good for me, at least 
not without loss of autonomy. It would be unfortunate but should not change our view 
about what is and what is not good for me.  
This objection misunderstands the nature of Railton’s proposal. As opposed to 
other views about the good, full information theories despair of the possibility of 
providing us with a list of states of affairs that are good for us, or a direct characterization 
of these states of affairs. As we noted before, their path is oblique. They claim that the 
way to determine what is good for a person is to describe a natural psychological process 
and claim that whatever desires emerge out of this process determine what is good for 
one. But on this approach the natural psychological process should make sense in its own 
right. We cannot – when we fail to make sense of the purported natural process – appeal 
to claims whose truth is supposed to be determined by that very process. Whether 
something is good for me or not is supposed to be determined by whether my fully 
informed self could desire it if she thought about my circumstances and at the very least 
cared about my autonomy. We can not turn around and explain how she can want me to 
want certain things, under these constraints, because these things are good for me. Doing 
so would be putting the cart before the horse. A full information view that would rely on 
judgments about what is good for me in order to determine the desires of my FIS would 
thus fail the determinacy constraint. It would fail to provide us with a determinate 
procedure for deciding what constitutes my well being. 
My FIS could want me to want to be better informed, or could want me to want to 
be told what my FIS wants for me – and so we could conclude that it is generally good 
for me to be better informed or to know what my FIS wants me to want. But in order to 
reach these general conclusions we do not need a full information theory. I already want 
to be better informed.  
 
There may be a way of amending the view and thus saving it from this last 
criticism. Maybe my FIS wants me to have certain desires after she reveals to me all 
relevant information, or on the assumption that I have all relevant information. 
Second interpretation 
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E:  ‘X is good for me iff my FIS while considering my circumstances and 
imagining that I have all the information available to her would want me to want 
x’. 
 Thus my FIS is supposed to assume that I know that the liquid in the glass is 
bitter lemonade and not gin and then ask herself what she desires that I desire. But this 
approach is also bound to fail. Presuming that I have all the information that my FIS has 
or giving me that entire information means treating me as identical to my FIS and thus 
finding my well being to be identical to that of my FIS. But the whole point of the Advice 
Model was to separate what is good for my fully informed self from what is good for me. 
What is good for my fully informed self is often good for her only because she has 
capacities, knowledge and experiences that I do not have. However on the second 
interpretation the two will coincide. We must therefore also reject this interpretation. 
 
 A different approach must be sought. Maybe my FIS is not just supposed to want 
me to have certain desires but rather is supposed to want me to have these desires after I 
am told that my FIS wants me to have them. What my FIS wants is that I would want to 
have certain desires when it is disclosed to me that these are the desires he wants me to 
have. Call this view the ‘Disclosure Advice Model’ or for short ‘DAM’.  
Third interpretation 
F: x is good for me iff my FIS while considering my circumstances and assuming that I 
know that he wants me to desire x, would want me to desire x.’ 
 
This suggestion does solve some of the problems mentioned above. If I believe 
that my FIS wants me to have certain desires, and assuming that I want to have whatever 
desires my FIS wants me to have, and that I am reasonable, it is quite possible that I will 
naturally come to have these desires. So it’s not crazy, even for an FIS who does not want 
to impose on me a psychological rift, to want me to have them under these conditions.  
 However we now see that this interpretation as well as the first two does not 
satisfy constraint number 1, in fact these interpretations do not address in any way the 
concern that led us to accept the first constraint. All three interpretations appeal to the 
desires of the FIS without specifying in any way the standards under which these desires 
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should be adopted. As I claimed above such standards are clearly needed. The FIS must 
ask herself not only what she desires for herself or for the actual self, but also what she 
should want the actual self to want given what she desires. To answer this question she 
must appeal to some justifying standards that will determine whether or not it is 
reasonable for her to desire that the actual self have certain desires.  
 
 When we combine the lesson that pushed us toward DAM and our reasonability 
and minimal autonomy constraint we get the following condition: 
Fourth interpretation 
 An FIS must only desire for his AS desires that it would be rational for the AS 
to adopt if he learns that his FIS wants him to adopt them.  
 Whether it is rational for the AS to adopt a desire when he learns that his 
purported21
 From the point of view of the FIS things look thus: we are asking my FIS to think 
what desires she could want me to want if a. she thought of herself as being in my shoes 
and if b. the list of desires she wanted me to adopt were constrained by the condition that 
it would be rational for me to adopt them if I learnt that she wants me to have them. Thus 
when my FIS deliberates whether to desire that I desire x or not, she cannot just stipulate 
that I will adopt any desire she wants me to adopt. If, concerning some desire for x that 
my FIS wants me to have, it is irrational for me
 FIS wants him to adopt it, depends at least on whether he can understand the 
justification for adopting the desire, or at the very least on whether there could be anyone 
that the AS might reasonably trust that could understand that justification.  
22
DAM must then be interpreted along the following lines 
 to come to have this desire, then she 
should not want it for me. My FIS must ask herself what desires I could rationally come 
to have before she can decide what to desire to want for me. 
G: ‘x is good for me iff my FIS while contemplating my circumstances, and 
assuming that I am informed that she wants me to desire x, could reasonably want me to 
desire x, which depends on whether she could have good reasons to think that it would be 
                                                 
21 Whenever I talk of the FIS as seen from the perspective of the AS I will qualify the term with the word 
‘purported’. As we will shortly see unless the AS has good reason to think that a piece of advice he gets is 
indeed reasonable he has reason to doubt that this advice originates from the FIS. 
22 In the sense described above. 
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rational for me to adopt the desire for x if I thought that she wanted me to have it, which 
in turn depends on whether she could provide me or someone I could trust with a 
justification for adopting the desire for x.’ 
 
 We should now consider our last interpretation of DAM (G). 
 
 Considering G 
The first question we should answer is on what basis could my FIS have good 
reasons for thinking that it would be reasonable for me to adopt a desire she wants me to 
want. Suppose that I get a message informing me that my purported FIS wants me to 
want certain states of affairs. This of course would be quite a suspicious message. To 
believe that it is authentic I would need to believe four facts. First, that this message 
conveys to me information about someone who is me at a different time (that is, someone 
who developed from me or that I developed from). Second, I would have to believe that 
this person wants me to have the desires I am told she wants me to have. And third I 
would have to believe that she is fully informed and instrumentally rational. 
 Furthermore to have a good reason to act in accordance with my belief about the 
desires of my purported FIS I would have to think that she has a justification for wanting 
me to have the desire in question and she takes my autonomy into account when she 
decides which desires she wants me to have.  
 For the sake of argument let us assume that I can have good reasons to believe 
that the message is from someone who is me at a different time and that this person is 
fully informed and instrumentally rational. We are still left with the question of whether I 
have good reasons to believe that she has the desires in question and that she is justified 
in wanting me to have whatever desires she wants me to have. Could, then, I have good 
reasons to believe these two facts? The answer, I think, is mixed. There are some desires 
that I may have good reasons for thinking that my FIS wants me to have. And there are 
some circumstances in which I may have good reasons for thinking that she is justified in 
wanting me to have certain desires. There are however circumstances in which I could 
not have good reasons for believing in any of these purported facts.  
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 Let us consider non-problematic circumstances first; circumstances in which I 
could have a good reason for believing that my FIS wants me to have certain preferences. 
Consider the situation I am in when I am about to drink a glass of petrol thinking it is gin. 
My FIS knows I have petrol in my glass and therefore wants me to lose the desire to 
drink the contents of the glass. Could I have good reasons to think that this is what she 
wants and that she is justified in so wanting? The answer is yes. I could in principle be 
presented with evidence convincing me that I have petrol in my glass. And I therefore 
could in principle set up a mechanism to verify such evidence and would then be justified 
in acting on it. Furthermore it makes sense for my FIS to want me not to drink petrol, 
since he knows that I would rather not die and so he knows that it would be reasonable 
for me to accept his advice. It is, therefore, in principle possible for me to come to believe 
that my purported FIS does not want me to drink the content of my glass and that his 
desire meets the reasonability and autonomy constraints. 
 Consider a problematic case in turn. Could I be sure that my purported FIS desires 
me to desire some ice cream that she thinks is wonderful? Imagine that I have only had 
chocolate ice cream before and my FIS after tasting vanilla ice cream wants me to have 
vanilla ice cream. It is not clear on what grounds I could rest my confidence that she 
wants me to have this ice cream or that she is justified in wanting me to have it. It is not 
clear what facts could provide me with sufficient evidence for the claim that my 
purported FIS is justified in wanting me to have vanilla ice-cream. 
  
 There are three limitations that prevent the FIS from determining what to want for 
me on the basis of her experiences.  
 
i. Lack of instrumental relation 
 Assume for now that we do not doubt that the FIS had the experience she claims 
to have had when she tasted the vanilla ice-cream. The question is whether that 
experience can serve as the basis for justifying her desire that I desire to have the same 
ice cream?  
The relation between one’s experiences and one’s preferences for oneself is not a 
normative relation. This relation becomes normative only when certain information links 
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it to other existing preferences of the self23. When this is not the case the relation is 
merely a causal relation24. And the relation between one’s preferences and one’s own 
well being, for a fully informed person, is a constitutive relation25
 Here we reach the Humean origins of the desire based view. Facts about the 
experience of the FIS, fundamentally (that is in cases that do not involve a means-end 
relation) do not have normative authority. For the FIS herself these facts have a causal 
connection with her preferences and then a constitutive connection with her well being. 
But the FIS must seek a normative justification before she gives advice to the AS – and 
therefore cannot ground her advice in her experiences. 
. But both these 
relations cannot ground the normative relation that should guide the FIS in determining 
what she would want me to want. The experiences of the FIS can be the basis of her 
desires for the desires of the AS only when they can be linked to a means-ends inference 
that is based on the preferences of the AS. In these cases there may be a normative link 
between the preferences of the FIS and her advice for the AS. If the FIS knows that 
studying for the exam in a certain way will lead me to fail  and she knows that I want to 
succeed she may want me to avoid those choices that would lead to a failure. But the ice 
cream case is not of that sort. The FIS may taste two flavors of ice cream and prefer one 
over the other for herself. But unless these flavors have a characteristic that is somehow 
linked to what I desire (or should desire on the basis of other advice of the FIS) then the 
FIS’ experience cannot help her determine what flavor she should want me to want.  
 An objector might argue against this conclusion thus: if the vanilla ice-cream is 
tastier to the FIS than the chocolate one, then it would be tastier to the AS if she had tried 
it. And if the FIS prefers it over chocolate that means that the AS would have preferred it 
over chocolate if she would have tasted both. What more does one need in order to show 
that the AS would be reasonable in adopting the advice of the FIS to want the vanilla 
over the chocolate? 
 This simple argument masks the important assumptions upon which it is founded.  
                                                 
23 When I want A and my experience teaches me that the best way to achieve A is by doing B then my 
experience (given my previous desires) exerts normative pressure on me. 
24 Or so we would think if we adopted a desire based view of well being. 
25 See footnote 24. 
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On one interpretation the argument attempts to forge normative connections between the 
experiences of the FIS and his recommendations for the AS by an implicit reliance on a 
constant desire of the AS for pleasure. On that interpretation the experiences of the FIS 
reveal that this desire for pleasure can be satisfied. But part of the appeal of a desire 
based view of well being is its ability to give content to the slippery notion of pleasure of 
hedonistic or utilitarian views of well being. Indeed what the desire based view attempts 
to clarify is what it is for something to be part of one’s pleasure or well being. But then a 
reliance on the notion of pleasure in the analysis would render the view circular. 
 Alternatively the objector might try to rely, not on the experiences or the pleasure 
of the FIS, but rather on the fact that the AS herself would have preferred vanilla to 
chocolate if she had had the same experiences. However in doing so he fails to recognize 
the fact that since the relation between the FIS’ preferences and her own well being is a 
constitutive relation it cannot exist when the preferences are not present. Since the AS 
does not form similar preferences her well being cannot be similarly constituted. The 
situation is different in cases in which the information available to the FIS can be linked 
via a means-ends relation to the preferences of the AS. In these cases one can rely on the 
preferences of the AS to constitute her own well being, and the information available to 
the FIS only helps specify preferences that exist independently. 
 We can now return to the question with which we started this section. Could I 
have good reasons for thinking that my purported FIS is justified when she desires me to 
have a certain kind of ice-cream? The answer is that since my FIS can have no 
justification for wanting me to have vanilla over chocolate, I could have no reason for 
believing that she is justified in wanting me to have the preference for vanilla over 
chocolate.  
  The first limitation, then, is on preferences whose basis is in experiences that 
cannot be linked to the existing goals of the AS or with goals the AS should have. Only 
experiences that are relevant by way of means-ends reasoning to the goals of the AS (or 
the goals that the AS should have) could ground the justification of the advice of the FIS.  
 
ii. Some experiences are not publicly verifiable  
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Sometimes even though the experiences of the FIS are linked via means-ends 
relations to the existing preferences of the AS (or to those preferences that the AS should 
have) it is nevertheless impossible for the FIS to justify his desires about the preferences 
of the AS. Imagine that I feel a great delight after tasting a certain kind of ice cream - call 
it delight of type A - and want to repeat that experience. Now imagine that my FIS 
experiences what he claims is a qualitatively similar delight – delight of type A - when he 
tastes a mango. We now have a case in which the experiences of the FIS seem to be 
linked in the appropriate way via means-ends relations to the existing preferences of the 
AS. According to the information available to him eating mango will give me delight of 
type A – which I already want.  
Or consider another example. I am a liberal homosexual. My purported FIS is a 
redneck homophobe that can’t even think about spending time with people like me. This 
is not for him a moral issue, rather a choice backed by deep emotional and desiderative 
support. Since he knows that my desires are different than his he does not simply want 
me to have the object of his desires. For himself, he wants a heterosexual marriage but he 
doesn’t want me to want it. He knows that in my current state such marriage will not 
improve my well being. On the other hand he cannot think of me continuing to have what 
he considers to be my current ‘disgusting homosexual desires’. He wants me at the very 
least to start initiating a change in my preferences. His preferences for my desires are 
communicated to me. Now assume that his desires about homosexuality are the result of 
experiences he had after trying for the first time a heterosexual relation. His heterosexual 
experience leads him to develop a new appreciation of heterosexuality and a feeling of 
disgust towards homosexual relations. Further imagine that he claims that the experiences 
he has are of a similar character to ones I had in the past. He claims to know that the 
delight he experiences now is one I experienced before and one I would very much like to 
repeat, and the disgust he experiences now when thinking about homosexuality is one he 
knows I have experienced before (in other circumstances) and one I very much want to 
avoid. In this case as well the experiences of the FIS seem to be appropriately connected 
via a means-ends inference to the existing desires of the AS.  
But there is no way, even in principle, for me or for anyone I trust to verify that 
the experiences of my FIS have the same phenomenology as the experiences I liked in the 
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past. Therefore the relevant means-ends connection cannot be utilized to justify the FIS’ 
recommendation to me, and I could not have a good reason for believing that he would 
desire me to change my life if he considered things from my point of view.  
The full information theory under consideration tries to cash out intuitions about 
well being in terms of what a rational FIS would want me to want. But a rational FIS 
cannot want me to want what is unreasonable for me to want – and it is unreasonable for 
me to adjust my desires on the basis of information that is in principle unverifiable. 
I will now consider a third limitation on the desires of my FIS concerning my 
desires. 
 
iii. Changes in the preferences of the FIS 
A desire based theory of well being is necessarily a dynamic theory of well being. 
What is good for me now may not be good for me tomorrow. One might think that the 
same is not true for the FIS. I think it is: what is good for the FIS now may not be good 
for her tomorrow; what she desires now may not be what she desires tomorrow. Two 
factors explain the possibility of a change of preferences of the FIS over time. First, as we 
have seen, the experiences of the FIS cannot normatively determine her preferences and 
therefore even if we assume that her experiences are complete, this fact does not fully 
determine what she should desire on the basis of these experiences. Second, even if we 
assume that given a fixed set of experiences one could not legitimately have two different 
set of preferences, the FIS could nevertheless not be held to one fixed set of preferences. 
This is because there is a kind of information that one can never be in full possession of; 
this is the kind of information that one gets as one experiences one additional moment of 
life.  
So the FIS’ desires for himself change overtime. But what does this tell us about 
his desires for his AS? There are two options to consider. 
1. The FIS’ preferences for the AS26
2. The FIS’ preferences for the AS stay fixed. 
 change. 
                                                 
26 For simplicity sake let us assume that we consider the preferences of the FIS for his AS at a specific 
point of the AS’ life. 
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If, or to the extent that, the FIS’ preferences for the AS change we do not have a 
determinate account of the AS’ well being. The determinacy constraints thus limits the 
kind of desires that the FIS may want the AS to have. The FIS cannot ground his wants 
concerning the AS’ desires in his own changing desires, since if he did his wants for the 
desires of the AS would have to change as well.  
 If, on the other hand, the FIS’ preferences for the AS stay fixed, they do not vary 
with his own preferences. In itself this is not a problem since we have been assuming all 
along that not everything that the FIS wants for himself he will want his AS to want. 
However once we realize that the preferences of the FIS for his AS cannot vary with his 
own preferences and cannot even be based on preferences of the FIS that may vary over 
time, we must revisit the basis for the FIS’ advice to the AS.  
 There is only one type of preferences that the FIS could have for the AS that will 
not change as his own preferences for himself change. Preferences whose grounds are the 
combination of the actual preferences of the AS (or the preferences he should have) and 
publicly available information about the means for satisfying these preferences.  
 The third limitation thus points in the same direction as the previous two 
limitations. Some experiences – experiences that do not provide my FIS information that 
can be verified and experiences that cannot be linked via means ends reasoning to the 
goals of the AS (or the goals that the AS should have)– cannot be the grounds for desires 
of my FIS concerning the AS’ desires.  
 
 Our investigation is not over though. We have considered four interpretations of 
Railton’s view. We rejected the first three. The fourth interpretation G (the second 
variant of the disclosure advice model) has been partially promising. This interpretation 
successfully explains how my FIS could reasonably want me to have quite a few desires 
that would diverge from the desires that I actually have and whose objects are states of 
affairs that we naturally consider part of my non-moral good. We also saw however that 
on this interpretation there is a range of desires that my FIS could not reasonably want me 
to have. These are desires he would want me to have on the basis of experiences a. he 
could not link to desires I do have or should have or b. experiences that are not even in 
principle publicly accessible. What should we then think about the fourth interpretation? 
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The fourth interpretation offers us a coherent and determinate account of one’s non-moral 
good.  But as I will argue in the remaining section, the account of well being offered by 
the fourth interpretation fails to match our intuitions about one’s non-moral good. As an 
analysis of our pre theoretical understanding of non-moral good it may need to be 
rejected.  
   
3. A clash with intuitions 
Our starting point was the realization that many of one’s actual desires cannot 
determine what is good for her. We were looking for a theory that would deliver an 
amended set of desires hoping that this amended set would capture our intuitions about 
the notion of well being. We have investigated Railton’s view, considered how best to 
interpret it, and discovered what states of affairs it deems part of one’s well being. Call 
the set of the desires a person would have, had she adopted the desires her FIS wanted her 
to have under the fourth interpretation (G) of Railton’s view S*. What we want to know 
is whether the states of affairs desired by the desires in S* constitute a person’s well 
being? One way to go about answering that question is to ask whether S* captures our 
pre-theoretical intuitions about well being.  
 Let us consider an example: I am in a mood for an action movie. I want to see the 
most recent Bond movie. My FIS saw the movie. He had a terrible time. I ended up 
seeing it too and had a terrible time. I got out and wished I saw a good drama instead. 
Indeed if the inner workings of my mind were slightly different and I would have wanted 
to see a drama, and I went to see one, I would have had a great time. But things were not 
different and I went and saw an action movie that as it turned out I didn’t enjoy even one 
little bit. Not, mind you, because it was a bad action movie, as far as action movies go it 
was perfectly all right – rather because the experience of watching it made me – as I was 
watching it - want to watch something more sophisticated, more subtle, less violent. 
Going to see that action movie was not, we tend to think, part of the best life I could have 
had. Seeing a good drama would have been much better. My FIS has exactly the same 
thought. He says to himself ‘the life my AS had was not the best life he could have had’. 
But could he reasonably have wanted me to want to see the drama.  
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Could my FIS reasonably believe me to have any good reason for thinking that he 
wants me to watch a drama and not an action movie – as he should believe in order to 
want me to watch the drama according to the fourth interpretation of Railton’s view? 
The answer is no! There is no information that I could have gotten that would 
have made me believe that my FIS had the experiences that would justify the desires he 
claims to have had for my desires. I can believe that my FIS had changed his desires 
(from the desires we both had prior to him becoming fully informed to his current fully 
informed desires) but I could have no reason for thinking that he was rationally required 
to do so. The change in his desires is not irrational but is in no way rationally required or 
predictable given the information I could reasonably, even in principle, have access to 
and given what I knew or could have known about my own goals or the goals I should be 
having. Given my desire to see a good action movie, no information, short of information 
that revealed that the Bond movie was not an action movie or was not a good one – 
information that was not available since it was an action movie and a good one - could 
have required a change in his desires and therefore justified a change in my desires. 
This example shows that the only coherent version of Railton’s view cannot 
explain our intuitions about well being. We intuitively think that my life would have gone 
better if I watched a drama and not the Bond movie. Railton’s view – on our fourth 
interpretation – cannot explain that result.   
 Consider another example. This is an inverted version of my previous example of 
a homophobic and homosexual self. I (my AS) am a redneck homophobe. I hate 
homosexuals, liberals, intellectuals and in general any person displaying too much 
sensitivity, too much intelligence or too little patriotism. My attitude is not a matter of 
belief (or not a matter of beliefs alone) and certainly not a matter of mere moral beliefs; it 
reflects my deepest emotional reactions and my most central desires. My FIS had the 
misfortune (so I see it) to be stuck on an island with a homosexual person for two whole 
weeks. The experience changed the life of that poor soul (my FIS). He now respects 
homosexuals and wants to move to San Francisco. He would have wanted me to have a 
complete change of desires. From his perspective my happiness is being held back by my 
prejudices, by my bigoted upbringing, by a distorted view of what is attractive, virtuous, 
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joyful, moving and worthy. I, so he thinks, do not see the beauty and joy in the 
multiplicity of human experiences and forms of being. 
 We (the readers of this story) and my FIS think that my well being would increase 
significantly were I to adopt the preferences of my FIS. But can Railton’s view on our 
fourth interpretation deliver a similar conclusion? I think the answer is no. My FIS could 
not reasonably think that I have good reasons for believing that his new desires with 
respect to homosexuality are the desires of a reasonable and fully informed person with 
my constitution. The only beliefs I have grounds for forming are that he was bewitched, 
that the isolation on the island got to him, that he is confused, and that he is generally out 
of his mind. Of course, I know that others have similar desires to the ones now acquired 
by my FIS. But as far as I can tell their desires could not possibly justify a change in my 
desires: they are either lying about their experiences, or utterly different than me, or 
possessed by perverse passions in ways that hampers them from forming rational desires. 
In any case, I have no grounds for believing that my purported FIS is justified in wanting 
me to change my homophobic desires. My FIS could therefore not reasonably desire that 
I change my desires from what they currently are.  
 
Conclusions 
1. Full information views of well being analyze well being in terms of the desires of 
an FIS. To see whether any such analysis is acceptable or not one has to carefully 
examine the exact content of the desires that the FIS is expected to have. In 
particular one has to ensure that the desires the view attributes to the FIS are 
reasonable. If these are desires about the desires that the actual self should adopt, 
the reasonableness of the desires of the FIS must be tested bearing in mind what 
desires it would be reasonable for the actual self to adopt while maintaining her 
autonomy. Many seemingly attractive versions of full information views will be 
found unsatisfactory in light of such examination. 
2. According to the best interpretation of Railton’s view well being is determined by 
the desires a fully informed person could justifiably want his actual self to have, 
given the standards mentioned in the first conclusion above. When we consider 
examples we see that there is a gap between what we intuitively think is good for 
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one and what one’s FIS could justifiably desire for one. We are therefore bound to 
decide whether we want to reject the analysis of well being in terms of fully 
informed desires or whether we want to question our intuitions27
3. If we choose to reject our current intuitions concerning well being and to revise 
our conception of well being in light of the fourth interpretation of Railton’s view 
offered above we impose the following limitation on the concept of well being: 
what is good for us must be determined either by our current desires or by the set 
of desires we have good reason to come to have. What desires we have good 
reason to come to have will be determined by the combination of our current 
stable desires and policies, and information that is, at least in principle, publicly 
available.
. 
28
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 I take it that Railton’s view is the best developed analysis of well being in terms of fully informed desires 
currently on the market. I therefore tentatively suggest that our investigation teaches us something general 
about the relation between well being and what could reasonably be desired by a fully informed agent. 
28 The question of how should an agents change intrinsic desires in light of pressure from other intrinsic 
desire and new information is an extremely complicated question and deserves a discussion of its own. My 
formulation in the text is not intended to support any specific view about norms for changing intrinsic 
desires. It is merely intended to indicate that some such changes could be reasonably demanded.  
 For examples of cases in which changes in intrinsic desires would be justified see my “Desiring at 
Will and Humeanism in Practical Reason”, Philosophical Studies 119 (3):265-294. 
